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Abstract
This paper presents an Isabelle/HOL+Isar [1, 4] set of theories
which allows to specify crypto-based components and to verify their
composition properties wrt. cryptographic aspects. We introduce a
formalisation of the security property of data secrecy, the correspond-
ing definitions and proofs. A part of these definitions is based on [3].
Please note that here we import here the Isabelle/HOL theory ListEx-
tras.thy, presented in [2].
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1 Auxiliary data types
theory Secrecy-types
imports Main
begin
— We assume disjoint sets: Data of data values,
— Secrets of unguessable values, Keys - set of cryptographic keys.
— Based on these sets, we specify the sets EncType of encryptors that may be
— used for encryption or decryption, and Expression of expression items.
— The specification (component) identifiers should be listed in the set specID,
— the channel indentifiers should be listed in the set chanID.
datatype Keys = CKey | CKeyP | SKey | SKeyP | genKey
datatype Secrets = secretD | N | NA
type-synonym Var = nat
type-synonym Data = nat
datatype KS = kKS Keys | sKS Secrets
datatype EncType = kEnc Keys | vEnc Var
datatype specID = sComp1 | sComp2 | sComp3 | sComp4
datatype Expression = kE Keys | sE Secrets | dE Data | idE specID
datatype chanID = ch1 | ch2 | ch3 | ch4
primrec Expression2KSL:: Expression list ⇒ KS list
where
Expression2KSL [] = [] |
Expression2KSL (x#xs) =
((case x of (kE m) ⇒ [kKS m]
| (sE m) ⇒ [sKS m]
| (dE m) ⇒ []
| (idE m) ⇒ []) @ Expression2KSL xs)
primrec KS2Expression:: KS ⇒ Expression
where
KS2Expression (kKS m) = (kE m) |
KS2Expression (sKS m) = (sE m)
end
2 Correctness of the relations between sets of In-
put/Output channels
theory inout
imports Secrecy-types
begin
consts
subcomponents :: specID ⇒ specID set
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— Mappings, defining sets of input, local, and output channels
— of a component
consts
ins :: specID ⇒ chanID set
loc :: specID ⇒ chanID set
out :: specID ⇒ chanID set
— Predicate insuring the correct mapping from the component identifier
— to the set of input channels of a component
definition
inStream :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ bool
where
inStream x y ≡ (ins x = y)
— Predicate insuring the correct mapping from the component identifier
— to the set of local channels of a component
definition
locStream :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ bool
where
locStream x y ≡ (loc x = y)
— Predicate insuring the correct mapping from the component identifier
— to the set of output channels of a component
definition
outStream :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ bool
where
outStream x y ≡ (out x = y)
— Predicate insuring the correct relations between
— to the set of input, output and local channels of a component
definition
correctInOutLoc :: specID ⇒ bool
where
correctInOutLoc x ≡
(ins x ) ∩ (out x ) = {}
∧ (ins x ) ∩ (loc x ) = {}
∧ (loc x ) ∩ (out x ) = {}
— Predicate insuring the correct relations between
— sets of input channels within a composed component
definition
correctCompositionIn :: specID ⇒ bool
where
correctCompositionIn x ≡
(ins x ) = (
⋃
(ins ‘ (subcomponents x )) − (loc x ))
∧ (ins x ) ∩ (
⋃
(out ‘ (subcomponents x ))) = {}
— Predicate insuring the correct relations between
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— sets of output channels within a composed component
definition
correctCompositionOut :: specID ⇒ bool
where
correctCompositionOut x ≡
(out x ) = (
⋃
(out ‘ (subcomponents x ))− (loc x ))
∧ (out x ) ∩ (
⋃
(ins ‘ (subcomponents x ))) = {}
— Predicate insuring the correct relations between
— sets of local channels within a composed component
definition
correctCompositionLoc :: specID ⇒ bool
where
correctCompositionLoc x ≡
(loc x ) =
⋃
(ins ‘ (subcomponents x ))
∩
⋃
(out ‘ (subcomponents x ))
— If a component is an elementary one (has no subcomponents)
— its set of local channels should be empty
lemma subcomponents-loc:
assumes correctCompositionLoc x
and subcomponents x = {}
shows loc x = {}
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def )
end
3 Secrecy: Definitions and properties
theory Secrecy
imports Secrecy-types inout ListExtras
begin
— Encryption, decryption, signature creation and signature verification functions
— For these functions we define only their signatures and general axioms,
— because in order to reason effectively, we view them as abstract functions and
— abstract from their implementation details
consts
Enc :: Keys ⇒ Expression list ⇒ Expression list
Decr :: Keys ⇒ Expression list ⇒ Expression list
Sign :: Keys ⇒ Expression list ⇒ Expression list
Ext :: Keys ⇒ Expression list ⇒ Expression list
— Axioms on relations between encription and decription keys
axiomatization
EncrDecrKeys :: Keys ⇒ Keys ⇒ bool
where
ExtSign:
EncrDecrKeys K1 K2 −→ (Ext K1 (Sign K2 E )) = E and
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DecrEnc:
EncrDecrKeys K1 K2 −→ (Decr K2 (Enc K1 E )) = E
— Set of private keys of a component
consts
specKeys :: specID ⇒ Keys set
— Set of unguessable values used by a component
consts
specSecrets :: specID ⇒ Secrets set
— Join set of private keys and unguessable values used by a component
definition
specKeysSecrets :: specID ⇒ KS set
where
specKeysSecrets C ≡
{y . ∃ x . y = (kKS x ) ∧ (x ∈ (specKeys C ))} ∪
{z . ∃ s . z = (sKS s) ∧ (s ∈ (specSecrets C ))}
— Predicate defining that a list of expression items does not contain
— any private key or unguessable value used by a component
definition
notSpecKeysSecretsExpr :: specID ⇒ Expression list ⇒ bool
where
notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P e ≡
(∀ x . (kE x ) mem e −→ (kKS x ) /∈ specKeysSecrets P) ∧
(∀ y. (sE y) mem e −→ (sKS y) /∈ specKeysSecrets P)
— If a component is a composite one, the set of its private keys
— is a union of the subcomponents’ sets of the private keys
definition
correctCompositionKeys :: specID ⇒ bool
where
correctCompositionKeys x ≡
subcomponents x 6= {} −→
specKeys x =
⋃
(specKeys ‘ (subcomponents x ))
— If a component is a composite one, the set of its unguessable values
— is a union of the subcomponents’ sets of the unguessable values
definition
correctCompositionSecrets :: specID ⇒ bool
where
correctCompositionSecrets x ≡
subcomponents x 6= {} −→
specSecrets x =
⋃
(specSecrets ‘ (subcomponents x ))
— If a component is a composite one, the set of its private keys and
— unguessable values is a union of the corresponding sets of its subcomponents
definition
correctCompositionKS :: specID ⇒ bool
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where
correctCompositionKS x ≡
subcomponents x 6= {} −→
specKeysSecrets x =
⋃
(specKeysSecrets ‘ (subcomponents x ))
— Predicate defining set of correctness properties of the component’s
— interface and relations on its private keys and unguessable values
definition
correctComponentSecrecy :: specID ⇒ bool
where
correctComponentSecrecy x ≡
correctCompositionKS x ∧
correctCompositionSecrets x ∧
correctCompositionKeys x ∧
correctCompositionLoc x ∧
correctCompositionIn x ∧
correctCompositionOut x ∧
correctInOutLoc x
— Predicate exprChannel I E defines whether the expression item E can be sent
via the channel I
consts
exprChannel :: chanID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
— Predicate eoutM sP M E defines whether the component sP may eventually
— output an expression E if there exists a time interval t of
— an output channel which contains this expression E
definition
eout :: specID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
where
eout sP E ≡
∃ (ch :: chanID). ((ch ∈ (out sP)) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ))
— Predicate eout sP E defines whether the component sP may eventually
— output an expression E via subset of channels M,
— which is a subset of output channels of sP,
— and if there exists a time interval t of
— an output channel which contains this expression E
definition
eoutM :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
where
eoutM sP M E ≡
∃ (ch :: chanID). ((ch ∈ (out sP)) ∧ (ch ∈ M ) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ))
— Predicate ineM sP M E defines whether a component sP may eventually
— get an expression E if there exists a time interval t of
— an input stream which contains this expression E
definition
ine :: specID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
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where
ine sP E ≡
∃ (ch :: chanID). ((ch ∈ (ins sP)) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ))
— Predicate ine sP E defines whether a component sP may eventually
— get an expression E via subset of channels M,
— which is a subset of input channels of sP,
— and if there exists a time interval t of
— an input stream which contains this expression E
definition
ineM :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
where
ineM sP M E ≡
∃ (ch :: chanID). ((ch ∈ (ins sP)) ∧ (ch ∈ M ) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ))
— This predicate defines whether an input channel ch of a component sP
— is the only one input channel of this component
— via which it may eventually output an expression E
definition
out-exprChannelSingle :: specID ⇒ chanID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
where
out-exprChannelSingle sP ch E ≡
(ch ∈ (out sP)) ∧
(exprChannel ch E ) ∧
(∀ (x :: chanID) (t :: nat). ((x ∈ (out sP)) ∧ (x 6= ch) −→ ¬ exprChannel x E ))
— This predicate yields true if only the channels from the set chSet,
— which is a subset of input channels of the component sP,
— may eventually output an expression E
definition
out-exprChannelSet :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
where
out-exprChannelSet sP chSet E ≡
((∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ chSet) −→ ((x ∈ (out sP)) ∧ (exprChannel x E ))))
∧
(∀ (x :: chanID). ((x /∈ chSet) ∧ (x ∈ (out sP)) −→ ¬ exprChannel x E )))
— This redicate defines whether
— an input channel ch of a component sP is the only one input channel
— of this component via which it may eventually get an expression E
definition
ine-exprChannelSingle :: specID ⇒ chanID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
where
ine-exprChannelSingle sP ch E ≡
(ch ∈ (ins sP)) ∧
(exprChannel ch E ) ∧
(∀ (x :: chanID) (t :: nat). (( x ∈ (ins sP)) ∧ (x 6= ch) −→ ¬ exprChannel x
E ))
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— This predicate yields true if the component sP may eventually
— get an expression E only via the channels from the set chSet,
— which is a subset of input channels of sP
definition
ine-exprChannelSet :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
where
ine-exprChannelSet sP chSet E ≡
((∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ chSet) −→ ((x ∈ (ins sP)) ∧ (exprChannel x E ))))
∧
(∀ (x :: chanID). ((x /∈ chSet) ∧ ( x ∈ (ins sP)) −→ ¬ exprChannel x E )))
— If a list of expression items does not contain any private key
— or unguessable value of a component P, then the first element
— of the list is neither a private key nor unguessable value of P
lemma notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-L1 :
assumes notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P (a # l)
shows notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P [a]
using assms by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
— If a list of expression items does not contain any private key
— or unguessable value of a component P, then this list without its first
— element does not contain them too
lemma notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-L2 :
assumes notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P (a # l)
shows notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P l
using assms by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
— If a channel belongs to the set of input channels of a component P
— and does not belong to the set of local channels of the compositon of P and Q
— then it belongs to the set of input channels of this composition
lemma correctCompositionIn-L1 :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ch /∈ loc PQ
and ch ∈ ins P
shows ch ∈ ins PQ
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def )
— If a channel belongs to the set of input channels of the compositon of P and Q
— then it belongs to the set of input channels either of P or of Q
lemma correctCompositionIn-L2 :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ch ∈ ins PQ
shows (ch ∈ ins P) ∨ (ch ∈ ins Q)
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def )
lemma ineM-L1 :
assumes ch ∈ M
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and ch ∈ ins P
and exprChannel ch E
shows ineM P M E
using assms by (simp add : ineM-def , blast)
lemma ineM-ine:
assumes ineM P M E
shows ine P E
using assms by (simp add : ineM-def ine-def , blast)
lemma not-ine-ineM :
assumes ¬ ine P E
shows ¬ ineM P M E
using assms by (simp add : ineM-def ine-def )
lemma eoutM-eout :
assumes eoutM P M E
shows eout P E
using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def eout-def , blast)
lemma not-eout-eoutM :
assumes ¬ eout P E
shows ¬ eoutM P M E
using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def eout-def )
lemma correctCompositionKeys-subcomp1 :
assumes correctCompositionKeys C
and x ∈ subcomponents C
and xb ∈ specKeys C
shows ∃ x ∈ subcomponents C . (xb ∈ specKeys x )
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKeys-def , auto)
lemma correctCompositionSecrets-subcomp1 :
assumes correctCompositionSecrets C
and x ∈ subcomponents C
and s ∈ specSecrets C
shows ∃ x ∈ subcomponents C . (s ∈ specSecrets x )
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionSecrets-def , auto)
lemma correctCompositionKeys-subcomp2 :
assumes correctCompositionKeys C
and xb ∈ subcomponents C
and xc ∈ specKeys xb
shows xc ∈ specKeys C
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKeys-def , auto)
lemma correctCompositionSecrets-subcomp2 :
assumes correctCompositionSecrets C
and xb ∈ subcomponents C
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and xc ∈ specSecrets xb
shows xc ∈ specSecrets C
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionSecrets-def , auto)
lemma correctCompKS-Keys :
assumes correctCompositionKS C
shows correctCompositionKeys C
proof (cases subcomponents C = {})
assume subcomponents C = {}
from this and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : correctCompositionKeys-def )
next
assume subcomponents C 6= {}
from this and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def
correctCompositionKeys-def
specKeysSecrets-def , blast)
qed
lemma correctCompKS-Secrets :
assumes correctCompositionKS C
shows correctCompositionSecrets C
proof (cases subcomponents C = {})
assume subcomponents C = {}
from this and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : correctCompositionSecrets-def )
next
assume subcomponents C 6= {}
from this and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def
correctCompositionSecrets-def
specKeysSecrets-def , blast)
qed
lemma correctCompKS-KeysSecrets :
assumes correctCompositionKeys C
and correctCompositionSecrets C
shows correctCompositionKS C
proof (cases subcomponents C = {})
assume subcomponents C = {}
from this and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def )
next
assume subcomponents C 6= {}
from this and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def
correctCompositionKeys-def
correctCompositionSecrets-def
specKeysSecrets-def , blast)
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qed
lemma correctCompositionKS-subcomp1 :
assumes correctCompositionKS C
and h1 :x ∈ subcomponents C
and xa ∈ specKeys C
shows ∃ y ∈ subcomponents C . (xa ∈ specKeys y)
proof (cases subcomponents C = {})
assume subcomponents C = {}
from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp
next
assume subcomponents C 6= {}
from this and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def specKeysSecrets-def , blast)
qed
lemma correctCompositionKS-subcomp2 :
assumes correctCompositionKS C
and h1 :x ∈ subcomponents C
and xa ∈ specSecrets C
shows ∃ y ∈ subcomponents C . xa ∈ specSecrets y
proof (cases subcomponents C = {})
assume subcomponents C = {}
from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp
next
assume subcomponents C 6= {}
from this and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def specKeysSecrets-def , blast)
qed
lemma correctCompositionKS-subcomp3 :
assumes correctCompositionKS C
and x ∈ subcomponents C
and xa ∈ specKeys x
shows xa ∈ specKeys C
using assms
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def specKeysSecrets-def , auto)
lemma correctCompositionKS-subcomp4 :
assumes correctCompositionKS C
and x ∈ subcomponents C
and xa ∈ specSecrets x
shows xa ∈ specSecrets C
using assms
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def specKeysSecrets-def , auto)
lemma correctCompositionKS-PQ :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
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and ks ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
shows ks ∈ specKeysSecrets P ∨ ks ∈ specKeysSecrets Q
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def )
lemma correctCompositionKS-neg1 :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and ks /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and ks /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
shows ks /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def )
lemma correctCompositionKS-negP :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and ks /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
shows ks /∈ specKeysSecrets P
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def )
lemma correctCompositionKS-negQ :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and ks /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
shows ks /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def )
lemma out-exprChannelSingle-Set :
assumes out-exprChannelSingle P ch E
shows out-exprChannelSet P {ch} E
using assms
by (simp add : out-exprChannelSingle-def out-exprChannelSet-def )
lemma out-exprChannelSet-Single:
assumes out-exprChannelSet P {ch} E
shows out-exprChannelSingle P ch E
using assms
by (simp add : out-exprChannelSingle-def out-exprChannelSet-def )
lemma ine-exprChannelSingle-Set :
assumes ine-exprChannelSingle P ch E
shows ine-exprChannelSet P {ch} E
using assms
by (simp add : ine-exprChannelSingle-def ine-exprChannelSet-def )
lemma ine-exprChannelSet-Single:
assumes ine-exprChannelSet P {ch} E
shows ine-exprChannelSingle P ch E
using assms
by (simp add : ine-exprChannelSingle-def ine-exprChannelSet-def )
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lemma ine-ins-neg1 :
assumes ¬ ine P m
and exprChannel x m
shows x /∈ ins P
using assms by (simp add : ine-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem1a:
assumes ine PQ E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ine P E ∨ ine Q E
using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem1b:
assumes ineM PQ M E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ineM P M E ∨ ineM Q M E
using assms by (simp add : ineM-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem2a:
assumes eout PQ E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
shows eout P E ∨ eout Q E
using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem2b:
assumes eoutM PQ M E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
shows eoutM P M E ∨ eoutM Q M E
using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto)
lemma correctCompositionIn-prop1 :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and x ∈ (ins PQ)
shows (x ∈ (ins P)) ∨ (x ∈ (ins Q))
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def )
lemma correctCompositionOut-prop1 :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and x ∈ (out PQ)
shows (x ∈ (out P)) ∨ (x ∈ (out Q))
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionOut-def )
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theorem TBtheorem3a:
assumes ¬ (ine P E )
and ¬ (ine Q E )
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ¬ (ine PQ E )
using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto )
theorem TBlemma3b:
assumes h1 :¬ (ineM P M E )
and h2 :¬ (ineM Q M E )
and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ
and chM :ch ∈ M
and chPQ :ch ∈ ins PQ
and eCh:exprChannel ch E
shows False
proof (cases ch ∈ ins P)
assume a1 :ch ∈ ins P
from a1 and chM and eCh have ineM P M E by (simp add : ineM-L1 )
from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp
next
assume a2 :ch /∈ ins P
from subPQ and cCompI and chPQ have (ch ∈ ins P) ∨ (ch ∈ ins Q)
by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-L2 )
from this and a2 have ch ∈ ins Q by simp
from this and chM and eCh have ineM Q M E by (simp add : ineM-L1 )
from this and h2 show ?thesis by simp
qed
theorem TBtheorem3b:
assumes ¬ (ineM P M E )
and ¬ (ineM Q M E )
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ¬ (ineM PQ M E )
using assms by (metis TBtheorem1b)
theorem TBtheorem4a-empty:
assumes (ine P E ) ∨ (ine Q E )
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and loc PQ = {}
shows ine PQ E
using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4a-P :
assumes ine P E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
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and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ∃ ch. (ch ∈ (ins P) ∧ exprChannel ch E ∧ ch /∈ (loc PQ))
shows ine PQ E
using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4b-P :
assumes ineM P M E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ∃ ch. ((ch ∈ (ins Q)) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ) ∧
(ch /∈ (loc PQ)) ∧ (ch ∈ M ))
shows ineM PQ M E
using assms by (simp add : ineM-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4a-PQ :
assumes (ine P E ) ∨ (ine Q E )
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ∃ ch. (((ch ∈ (ins P)) ∨ (ch ∈ (ins Q) )) ∧
(exprChannel ch E ) ∧ (ch /∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ine PQ E
using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4b-PQ :
assumes (ineM P M E ) ∨ (ineM Q M E )
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ∃ ch. (((ch ∈ (ins P)) ∨ (ch ∈ (ins Q) )) ∧
(ch ∈ M ) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ) ∧ (ch /∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ineM PQ M E
using assms by (simp add : ineM-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4a-notP1 :
assumes ine P E
and ¬ ine Q E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ∃ ch. ((ine-exprChannelSingle P ch E ) ∧ (ch ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ ine PQ E
using assms
by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def
ine-exprChannelSingle-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4b-notP1 :
assumes ineM P M E
and ¬ ineM Q M E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ∃ ch. ((ine-exprChannelSingle P ch E ) ∧ (ch ∈ M )
15
∧ (ch ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ ineM PQ M E
using assms
by (simp add : ineM-def correctCompositionIn-def
ine-exprChannelSingle-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4a-notP2 :
assumes ¬ ine Q E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ine-exprChannelSet P ChSet E
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSet) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ ine PQ E
using assms
by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def
ine-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4b-notP2 :
assumes ¬ ineM Q M E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ine-exprChannelSet P ChSet E
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSet) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ ineM PQ M E
using assms
by (simp add : ineM-def correctCompositionIn-def
ine-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4a-notPQ :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ine-exprChannelSet P ChSetP E
and ine-exprChannelSet Q ChSetQ E
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSetP) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSetQ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ ine PQ E
using assms
by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def
ine-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
lemma ineM-Un1 :
assumes ineM P A E
shows ineM P (A Un B) E
using assms by (simp add : ineM-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4b-notPQ :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ine-exprChannelSet P ChSetP E
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and ine-exprChannelSet Q ChSetQ E
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSetP) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSetQ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ ineM PQ M E
using assms
by (simp add : ineM-def correctCompositionIn-def
ine-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
lemma ine-nonempty-exprChannelSet :
assumes ine-exprChannelSet P ChSet E
and ChSet 6= {}
shows ine P E
using assms by (simp add : ine-def ine-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
lemma ine-empty-exprChannelSet :
assumes ine-exprChannelSet P ChSet E
and ChSet = {}
shows ¬ ine P E
using assms by (simp add : ine-def ine-exprChannelSet-def )
theorem TBtheorem5a-empty:
assumes (eout P E ) ∨ (eout Q E )
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and loc PQ = {}
shows eout PQ E
using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem45a-P :
assumes eout P E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and ∃ ch. ((ch ∈ (out P)) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ) ∧
(ch /∈ (loc PQ)))
shows eout PQ E
using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto)
theorem TBtheore54b-P :
assumes eoutM P M E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and ∃ ch. ((ch ∈ (out Q)) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ) ∧
(ch /∈ (loc PQ)) ∧ (ch ∈ M ) )
shows eoutM PQ M E
using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5a-PQ :
assumes (eout P E ) ∨ (eout Q E )
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
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and correctCompositionOut PQ
and ∃ ch. (((ch ∈ (out P)) ∨ (ch ∈ (out Q) )) ∧
(exprChannel ch E ) ∧ (ch /∈ (loc PQ)))
shows eout PQ E
using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5b-PQ :
assumes (eoutM P M E ) ∨ (eoutM Q M E )
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and ∃ ch. (((ch ∈ (out P)) ∨ (ch ∈ (out Q) )) ∧ (ch ∈ M )
∧ (exprChannel ch E ) ∧ (ch /∈ (loc PQ)))
shows eoutM PQ M E
using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5a-notP1 :
assumes eout P E
and ¬ eout Q E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and ∃ ch. ((out-exprChannelSingle P ch E ) ∧ (ch ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ eout PQ E
using assms
by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def
out-exprChannelSingle-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5b-notP1 :
assumes eoutM P M E
and ¬ eoutM Q M E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and ∃ ch. ((out-exprChannelSingle P ch E ) ∧ (ch ∈ M )
∧ (ch ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ eoutM PQ M E
using assms
by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def
out-exprChannelSingle-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5a-notP2 :
assumes ¬ eout Q E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and out-exprChannelSet P ChSet E
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSet) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ eout PQ E
using assms
by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def
out-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
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theorem TBtheorem5b-notP2 :
assumes ¬ eoutM Q M E
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and out-exprChannelSet P ChSet E
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSet) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ eoutM PQ M E
using assms
by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def
out-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5a-notPQ :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and out-exprChannelSet P ChSetP E
and out-exprChannelSet Q ChSetQ E
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSetP) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSetQ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ eout PQ E
using assms
by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def
out-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5b-notPQ :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionOut PQ
and out-exprChannelSet P ChSetP E
and out-exprChannelSet Q ChSetQ E
and M = ChSetP ∪ ChSetQ
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSetP) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
and ∀ (x ::chanID). ((x ∈ ChSetQ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ)))
shows ¬ eoutM PQ M E
using assms
by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def
out-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
end
4 Local Secrets of a component
theory CompLocalSecrets
imports Secrecy
begin
— Set of local secrets: the set of secrets which does not belong to
— the set of private keys and unguessable values, but are transmitted
— via local channels or belongs to the local secrets of its subcomponents
axiomatization
LocalSecrets :: specID ⇒ KS set
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where
LocalSecretsDef :
LocalSecrets A =
{(m :: KS ). m /∈ specKeysSecrets A ∧
((∃ x y. ((x ∈ loc A) ∧ m = (kKS y) ∧ (exprChannel x (kE y))))
|(∃ x z . ((x ∈ loc A) ∧ m = (sKS z ) ∧ (exprChannel x (sE z )) )) )}
∪ (
⋃
(LocalSecrets ‘ (subcomponents A) ))
lemma LocalSecretsComposition1 :
assumes ls ∈ LocalSecrets P
and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
shows ls ∈ LocalSecrets PQ
using assms by (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef , auto)
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-k :
assumes exprChannel x (kE Keys)
and ¬ ine P (kE Keys)
and ¬ ine Q (kE Keys)
and ¬ (x /∈ ins P ∧ x /∈ ins Q)
shows False
using assms by (metis ine-def )
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-s :
assumes exprChannel x (sE Secrets)
and ¬ ine P (sE Secrets)
and ¬ ine Q (sE Secrets)
and ¬ (x /∈ ins P ∧ x /∈ ins Q)
shows False
using assms by (metis ine-ins-neg1 )
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-k :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and ¬ ine P (kE Keys)
and ¬ ine Q (kE Keys)
and kKS Keys /∈ LocalSecrets P
and kKS Keys /∈ LocalSecrets Q
shows kKS Keys /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
proof −
from assms show ?thesis
apply (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef ,
simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def , clarify)
by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-k , auto)
qed
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg-k :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
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and (kKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and (kKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and ¬ ine P (kE m)
and ¬ ine Q (kE m)
and (kKS m) /∈ ((LocalSecrets P) ∪ (LocalSecrets Q))
shows (kKS m) /∈ (LocalSecrets PQ)
proof −
from assms show ?thesis
apply (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef ,
simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def , clarify)
by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-k , auto)
qed
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg-s :
assumes subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and cCompLoc:correctCompositionLoc PQ
and cCompKS :correctCompositionKS PQ
and notKSP :(sKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and notKSQ :(sKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and ¬ ine P (sE m)
and ¬ ine Q (sE m)
and notLocSeqPQ :(sKS m) /∈ ((LocalSecrets P) ∪ (LocalSecrets Q))
shows (sKS m) /∈ (LocalSecrets PQ)
proof −
from subPQ and cCompKS and notKSP and notKSQ
have sg1 :sKS m /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-neg1 )
from subPQ and cCompLoc and notLocSeqPQ have sg2 :
sKS m /∈
⋃
(LocalSecrets ‘ subcomponents PQ)
by simp
from sg1 and sg2 and assms show ?thesis
apply (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef ,
simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def , clarify)
by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-s , auto)
qed
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg:
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and ks /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and ks /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and h1 :∀ m. ks = kKS m −→ (¬ ine P (kE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (kE m))
and h2 :∀ m. ks = sKS m −→ (¬ ine P (sE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (sE m))
and ks /∈ ((LocalSecrets P) ∪ (LocalSecrets Q))
shows ks /∈ (LocalSecrets PQ)
proof (cases ks)
fix m
assume a1 :ks = kKS m
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from this and h1 have ¬ ine P (kE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (kE m) by simp
from this and a1 and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg-k)
next
fix m
assume a2 :ks = sKS m
from this and h2 have ¬ ine P (sE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (sE m) by simp
from this and a2 and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg-s)
qed
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-s :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and ¬ ine P (sE s)
and ¬ ine Q (sE s)
and sKS s /∈ LocalSecrets P
and sKS s /∈ LocalSecrets Q
shows sKS s /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
proof −
from assms have
sKS s /∈
⋃
(LocalSecrets ‘ subcomponents PQ)
by simp
from assms and this show ?thesis
apply (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef ,
simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def , clarify)
by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-s , auto)
qed
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg1 :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and h1 :∀ m. ks = kKS m −→ (¬ ine P (kE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (kE m))
and h2 :∀ m. ks = sKS m −→ (¬ ine P (sE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (sE m))
and ks /∈ LocalSecrets P
and ks /∈ LocalSecrets Q
shows ks /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
proof (cases ks)
fix m
assume a1 :ks = kKS m
from this and h1 have ¬ ine P (kE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (kE m) by simp
from this and a1 and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-k)
next
fix m
assume a2 :ks = sKS m
from this and h2 have ¬ ine P (sE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (sE m) by simp
from this and a2 and assms show ?thesis
by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-s)
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qed
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-k :
assumes kKS k ∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and ¬ ine Q (kE k)
and kKS k /∈ LocalSecrets P
and kKS k /∈ LocalSecrets Q
shows ine P (kE k)
using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-k)
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-s :
assumes sKS s ∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and ¬ ine Q (sE s)
and sKS s /∈ LocalSecrets P
and sKS s /∈ LocalSecrets Q
shows ine P (sE s)
using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-s)
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-ine2-k :
assumes kKS k ∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and ¬ ine P (kE k)
and kKS k /∈ LocalSecrets P
and kKS k /∈ LocalSecrets Q
shows ine Q (kE k)
using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-k)
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-ine2-s :
assumes sKS s ∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and ¬ ine P (sE s)
and sKS s /∈ LocalSecrets P
and sKS s /∈ LocalSecrets Q
shows ine Q (sE s)
using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-s)
lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-k :
assumes kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets P
and exprChannel ch (kE key)
and kKS key /∈ specKeysSecrets P
shows ch /∈ loc P
using assms by (simp only: LocalSecretsDef , auto)
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lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-s :
assumes sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets P
and exprChannel ch (sE secret)
and sKS secret /∈ specKeysSecrets P
shows ch /∈ loc P
using assms by (simp only: LocalSecretsDef , auto)
lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-P :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and ch ∈ ins P
and exprChannel ch (kE key)
and kKS key /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (kE key)
using assms
by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-k correctCompositionIn-L1 )
lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Pex :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and ch ∈ ins P
and exprChannel ch (kE key)
and kKS key /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ∃ ch. ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (kE key)
using assms
by (metis correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-P)
lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Q :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and ch ∈ ins Q
and h1 :exprChannel ch (kE key)
and kKS key /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (kE key)
proof −
from assms have ch /∈ loc PQ
by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-k)
from this and assms have ch ∈ ins PQ
by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def )
from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp
qed
lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Qex :
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assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and ch ∈ ins Q
and exprChannel ch (kE key)
and kKS key /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ∃ ch. ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (kE key)
using assms
by (metis correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Q)
lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-P :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and ch ∈ ins P
and exprChannel ch (sE secret)
and sKS secret /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (sE secret)
using assms
by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-s correctCompositionIn-L1 )
lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Pex :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and ch ∈ ins P
and exprChannel ch (sE secret)
and sKS secret /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ∃ ch. ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (sE secret)
using assms
by (metis correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-P)
lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Q :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and ch ∈ ins Q
and h1 :exprChannel ch (sE secret)
and sKS secret /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (sE secret)
proof −
from assms have ch /∈ loc PQ
by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-s)
from this and assms have ch ∈ ins PQ
by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def )
25
from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp
qed
lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Qex :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
and ch ∈ ins Q
and exprChannel ch (sE secret)
and sKS secret /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ∃ ch. ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (sE secret)
using assms
by (metis correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Q)
end
5 Knowledge of Keys and Secrets
theory KnowledgeKeysSecrets
imports CompLocalSecrets
begin
An component A knows a secret m (or some secret expression m) that does not
belong to its local secrets , if
• A may eventually get the secret m,
• m belongs to the set LSA of its local secrets,
• A knows some list of expressions m2 which is an concatenations of m and
some list of expressions m1,
• m is a concatenation of some lists of secrets m1 and m2, and A knows both
these secrets,
• A knows some secret key k−1 and the result of the encryption of the m with
the corresponding public key,
• A knows some public key k and the result of the signature creation of the m
with the corresponding private key,
• m is an encryption of some secret m1 with a public key k, and A knows both
m1 and k,
• m is the result of the signature creation of the m1 with the key k, and A
knows both m1 and k.
primrec
know :: specID ⇒ KS ⇒ bool
where
know A (kKS m) =
((ine A (kE m)) ∨ ((kKS m) ∈ (LocalSecrets A))) |
know A (sKS m) =
((ine A (sE m)) ∨ ((sKS m) ∈ (LocalSecrets A)))
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axiomatization
knows :: specID ⇒ Expression list ⇒ bool
where
knows-emptyexpression:
knows C [] = True and
know1k :
knows C [KS2Expression (kKS m1 )] = know C (kKS m1 ) and
know1s :
knows C [KS2Expression (sKS m2 )] = know C (sKS m2 ) and
knows2a:
knows A (e1 @ e) −→ knows A e and
knows2b:
knows A (e @ e1 ) −→ knows A e and
knows3 :
(knows A e1 ) ∧ (knows A e2 ) −→ knows A (e1 @ e2 ) and
knows4 :
(IncrDecrKeys k1 k2 ) ∧ (know A (kKS k2 )) ∧ (knows A (Enc k1 e))
−→ knows A e
and
knows5 :
(IncrDecrKeys k1 k2 ) ∧ (know A (kKS k1 )) ∧ (knows A (Sign k2 e))
−→ knows A e
and
knows6 :
(know A (kKS k)) ∧ (knows A e1 ) −→ knows A (Enc k e1 )
and
knows7 :
(know A (kKS k)) ∧ (knows A e1 ) −→ knows A (Sign k e1 )
primrec eoutKnowCorrect :: specID ⇒ KS ⇒ bool
where
eout-know-k :
eoutKnowCorrect C (kKS m) =
((eout C (kE m)) ←→ (m ∈ (specKeys C ) ∨ (know C (kKS m))) ) |
eout-know-s :
eoutKnowCorrect C (sKS m) =
((eout C (sE m)) ←→ (m ∈ (specSecrets C ) ∨ (know C (sKS m))) )
definition eoutKnowsECorrect :: specID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool
where
eoutKnowsECorrect C e ≡
((eout C e) ←→
((∃ k . e = (kE k) ∧ (k ∈ specKeys C )) ∨
(∃ s . e = (sE s) ∧ (s ∈ specSecrets C )) ∨
(knows C [e])))
lemma eoutKnowCorrect-L1k :
assumes eoutKnowCorrect C (kKS m)
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and eout C (kE m)
shows m ∈ (specKeys C ) ∨ (know C (kKS m))
using assms by (metis eout-know-k)
lemma eoutKnowCorrect-L1s :
assumes eoutKnowCorrect C (sKS m)
and eout C (sE m)
shows m ∈ (specSecrets C ) ∨ (know C (sKS m))
using assms by (metis eout-know-s)
lemma eoutKnowsECorrect-L1 :
assumes eoutKnowsECorrect C e
and eout C e
shows (∃ k . e = (kE k) ∧ (k ∈ specKeys C )) ∨
(∃ s . e = (sE s) ∧ (s ∈ specSecrets C )) ∨
(knows C [e])
using assms by (metis eoutKnowsECorrect-def )
lemma know2knows-k :
assumes know A (kKS m)
shows knows A [kE m]
using assms
by (metis KS2Expression.simps(1 ) know1k)
lemma knows2know-k :
assumes knows A [kE m]
shows know A (kKS m)
using assms
by (metis KS2Expression.simps(1 ) know1k)
lemma know2knowsPQ-k :
assumes know P (kKS m) ∨ know Q (kKS m)
shows knows P [kE m] ∨ knows Q [kE m]
using assms by (metis know2knows-k)
lemma knows2knowPQ-k :
assumes knows P [kE m] ∨ knows Q [kE m]
shows know P (kKS m) ∨ know Q (kKS m)
using assms by (metis knows2know-k)
lemma knows1k :
know A (kKS m) = knows A [kE m]
by (metis know2knows-k knows2know-k)
lemma know2knows-neg-k :
assumes ¬ know A (kKS m)
shows ¬ knows A [kE m]
using assms by (metis knows1k)
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lemma knows2know-neg-k :
assumes ¬ knows A [kE m]
shows ¬ know A (kKS m)
using assms by (metis know2knowsPQ-k)
lemma know2knows-s :
assumes know A (sKS m)
shows knows A [sE m]
using assms
by (metis KS2Expression.simps(2 ) know1s)
lemma knows2know-s :
assumes knows A [sE m]
shows know A (sKS m)
using assms
by (metis KS2Expression.simps(2 ) know1s)
lemma know2knowsPQ-s :
assumes know P (sKS m) ∨ know Q (sKS m)
shows knows P [sE m] ∨ knows Q [sE m]
using assms by (metis know2knows-s)
lemma knows2knowPQ-s :
assumes knows P [sE m] ∨ knows Q [sE m]
shows know P (sKS m) ∨ know Q (sKS m)
using assms by (metis knows2know-s)
lemma knows1s :
know A (sKS m) = knows A [sE m]
by (metis know2knows-s knows2know-s)
lemma know2knows-neg-s :
assumes ¬ know A (sKS m)
shows ¬ knows A [sE m]
using assms by (metis knows2know-s)
lemma knows2know-neg-s :
assumes ¬ knows A [sE m]
shows ¬ know A (sKS m)
using assms by (metis know2knows-s)
lemma knows2 :
assumes e2 = e1 @ e ∨ e2 = e @ e1
and knows A e2
shows knows A e
using assms by (metis knows2a knows2b)
lemma correctCompositionInLoc-exprChannel :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
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and correctCompositionIn PQ
and ch : ins P
and exprChannel ch m
and ∀ x . x ∈ ins PQ −→ ¬ exprChannel x m
shows ch : loc PQ
using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def , auto)
lemma eout-know-nonKS-k :
assumes m /∈ specKeys A
and eout A (kE m)
and eoutKnowCorrect A (kKS m)
shows know A (kKS m)
using assms by (metis eoutKnowCorrect-L1k)
lemma eout-know-nonKS-s :
assumes m /∈ specSecrets A
and eout A (sE m)
and eoutKnowCorrect A (sKS m)
shows know A (sKS m)
using assms by (metis eoutKnowCorrect-L1s)
lemma not-know-k-not-ine:
assumes ¬ know A (kKS m)
shows ¬ ine A (kE m)
using assms by simp
lemma not-know-s-not-ine:
assumes ¬ know A (sKS m)
shows ¬ ine A (sE m)
using assms by simp
lemma not-know-k-not-eout :
assumes m /∈ specKeys A
and ¬ know A (kKS m)
and eoutKnowCorrect A (kKS m)
shows ¬ eout A (kE m)
using assms by (metis eout-know-k)
lemma not-know-s-not-eout :
assumes m /∈ specSecrets A
and ¬ know A (sKS m)
and eoutKnowCorrect A (sKS m)
shows ¬ eout A (sE m)
using assms by (metis eout-know-nonKS-s)
lemma adv-not-know1 :
assumes out P ⊆ ins A
and ¬ know A (kKS m)
shows ¬ eout P (kE m)
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using assms
by (metis (full-types) eout-def ine-ins-neg1 not-know-k-not-ine set-rev-mp)
lemma adv-not-know2 :
assumes out P ⊆ ins A
and ¬ know A (sKS m)
shows ¬ eout P (sE m)
using assms
by (metis (full-types) eout-def ine-ins-neg1 not-know-s-not-ine set-rev-mp)
lemma LocalSecrets-L1 :
assumes (kKS ) key ∈ LocalSecrets P
and (kKS key) /∈
⋃
(LocalSecrets ‘ subcomponents P)
shows kKS key /∈ specKeysSecrets P
using assms by (simp only: LocalSecretsDef , auto)
lemma LocalSecrets-L2 :
assumes kKS key ∈ LocalSecrets P
and kKS key ∈ specKeysSecrets P
shows kKS key ∈
⋃
(LocalSecrets ‘ subcomponents P)
using assms by (simp only: LocalSecretsDef , auto)
lemma know-composition1 :
assumes notKSP :m /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and notKSQ :m /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and know P m
and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ
and cCompKS :correctCompositionKS PQ
shows know PQ m
proof (cases m)
fix key
assume a1 :m = kKS key
show ?thesis
proof (cases ine P (kE key))
assume a11 :ine P (kE key)
from this have a11ext :ine P (kE key) | ine Q (kE key) by simp
from subPQ and cCompKS and notKSP and notKSQ have m /∈ specK-
eysSecrets PQ
by (rule correctCompositionKS-neg1 )
from this and a1 have sg1 :kKS key /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ by simp
from a1 and a11ext and cCompKS show ?thesis
proof (cases loc PQ = {})
assume a11locE :loc PQ = {}
from a11ext and subPQ and cCompI and a11locE have ine PQ (kE key)
by (rule TBtheorem4a-empty)
from this and a1 show ?thesis by auto
next
assume a11locNE :loc PQ 6= {}
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from a1 and a11 and sg1 and assms show ?thesis
apply (simp add : ine-def , auto)
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Pex )
qed
next
assume a12 :¬ ine P (kE key)
from this and a1 and assms show ?thesis
by (auto, simp add : LocalSecretsComposition1 )
qed
next
fix secret
assume a2 :m = sKS secret
show ?thesis
proof (cases ine P (sE secret))
assume a21 :ine P (sE secret)
from this have a21ext :ine P (sE secret) | ine Q (sE secret) by simp
from subPQ and cCompKS and notKSP and notKSQ have m /∈ specK-
eysSecrets PQ
by (rule correctCompositionKS-neg1 )
from this and a2 have sg2 :sKS secret /∈ specKeysSecrets PQ by simp
from a2 and a21ext and cCompKS show ?thesis
proof (cases loc PQ = {})
assume a21locE :loc PQ = {}
from a21ext and subPQ and cCompI and a21locE have ine PQ (sE secret)
by (rule TBtheorem4a-empty)
from this and a2 show ?thesis by auto
next
assume a21locNE :loc PQ 6= {}
from a2 and a21 and sg2 and assms show ?thesis
apply (simp add : ine-def , auto)
by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Pex )
qed
next
assume a12 :¬ ine P (sE secret)
from this and a2 and assms show ?thesis
by (metis LocalSecretsComposition1 know .simps(2 ))
qed
qed
lemma know-composition2 :
assumes m /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and m /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and know Q m
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
shows know PQ m
using assms by (metis insert-commute know-composition1 )
32
lemma know-composition:
assumes m /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and m /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and know P m ∨ know Q m
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
shows know PQ m
using assms by (metis know-composition1 know-composition2 )
theorem know-composition-neg-ine-k :
assumes ¬ know P (kKS key)
and ¬ know Q (kKS key)
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ¬ (ine PQ (kE key))
using assms by (metis TBtheorem3a not-know-k-not-ine)
theorem know-composition-neg-ine-s :
assumes ¬ know P (sKS secret)
and ¬ know Q (sKS secret)
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ¬ (ine PQ (sE secret))
using assms by (metis TBtheorem3a not-know-s-not-ine)
lemma know-composition-neg1 :
assumes notknowP :¬ know P m
and notknowQ :¬ know Q m
and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and cCompLoc:correctCompositionLoc PQ
and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ
shows ¬ know PQ m
proof (cases m)
fix key
assume a1 :m = kKS key
from notknowP and a1 have sg1 :¬ know P (kKS key) by simp
then have sg1a:¬ ine P (kE key) by simp
from sg1 have sg1b:kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets P by simp
from notknowQ and a1 have sg2 :¬ know Q (kKS key) by simp
then have sg2a:¬ ine Q (kE key) by simp
from sg2 have sg2b:kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets Q by simp
from sg1 and sg2 and subPQ and cCompI have sg3 :¬ ine PQ (kE key)
by (rule know-composition-neg-ine-k)
from subPQ and cCompLoc and sg1a and sg2a and sg1b and sg2b have sg4 :
kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-k)
from sg3 and sg4 and a1 show ?thesis by simp
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next
fix secret
assume a2 :m = sKS secret
from notknowP and a2 have sg1 :¬ know P (sKS secret) by simp
then have sg1a:¬ ine P (sE secret) by simp
from sg1 have sg1b:sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets P by simp
from notknowQ and a2 have sg2 :¬ know Q (sKS secret) by simp
then have sg2a:¬ ine Q (sE secret) by simp
from sg2 have sg2b:sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets Q by simp
from sg1 and sg2 and subPQ and cCompI have sg3 :¬ ine PQ (sE secret)
by (rule know-composition-neg-ine-s)
from subPQ and cCompLoc and sg1a and sg2a and sg1b and sg2b have sg4 :
sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets PQ
by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-s)
from sg3 and sg4 and a2 show ?thesis by simp
qed
lemma know-decomposition:
assumes knowPQ :know PQ m
and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ
and cCompLoc:correctCompositionLoc PQ
shows know P m ∨ know Q m
proof (cases m)
fix key
assume a1 :m = kKS key
from this show ?thesis
proof (cases ine PQ (kE key))
assume a11 :ine PQ (kE key)
from this and subPQ and cCompI and a1 have
ine P (kE key) ∨ ine Q (kE key)
by (simp add : TBtheorem1a)
from this and a1 show ?thesis by auto
next
assume a12 :¬ ine PQ (kE key)
from this and knowPQ and a1 have sg2 :kKS key ∈ LocalSecrets PQ by auto
show ?thesis
proof (cases know Q m)
assume know Q m
from this show ?thesis by simp
next
assume not-knowQm:¬ know Q m
from not-knowQm and a1 have sg3a:¬ ine Q (kE key) by simp
from not-knowQm and a1 have sg3b:kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets Q by simp
show ?thesis
proof (cases kKS key ∈ LocalSecrets P)
assume kKS key ∈ LocalSecrets P
from this and a1 show ?thesis by simp
next
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assume kKS key /∈ LocalSecrets P
from sg2 and subPQ and cCompLoc and sg3a and this and sg3b have
ine P (kE key)
by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-k)
from this and a1 show ?thesis by simp
qed
qed
qed
next
fix secret
assume a2 :m = sKS secret
from this show ?thesis
proof (cases ine PQ (sE secret))
assume a21 :ine PQ (sE secret)
from this and subPQ and cCompI and a2 have
ine P (sE secret) ∨ ine Q (sE secret)
by (simp add : TBtheorem1a)
from this and a2 show ?thesis by auto
next
assume a22 :¬ ine PQ (sE secret)
from this and knowPQ and a2 have sg5 :
sKS secret ∈ LocalSecrets PQ by auto
show ?thesis
proof (cases know Q m)
assume know Q m
from this show ?thesis by simp
next
assume not-knowQm:¬ know Q m
from not-knowQm and a2 have sg6a:¬ ine Q (sE secret) by simp
from not-knowQm and a2 have sg6b:sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets Q by simp
show ?thesis
proof (cases sKS secret ∈ LocalSecrets P)
assume sKS secret ∈ LocalSecrets P
from this and a2 show ?thesis by simp
next
assume sKS secret /∈ LocalSecrets P
from sg5 and subPQ and cCompLoc and sg6a and this and sg6b have
ine P (sE secret)
by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-s)
from this and a2 show ?thesis by simp
qed
qed
qed
qed
lemma eout-knows-nonKS-k :
assumes m /∈ (specKeys A)
and eout A (kE m)
and eoutKnowsECorrect A (kE m)
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shows knows A [kE m]
using assms
by (metis Expression.distinct(1 ) Expression.inject(1 ) eoutKnowsECorrect-L1 )
lemma eout-knows-nonKS-s :
assumes h1 :m /∈ specSecrets A
and h2 :eout A (sE m)
and h3 :eoutKnowsECorrect A (sE m)
shows knows A [sE m]
using assms
by (metis Expression.distinct(1 ) Expression.inject(2 ) eoutKnowsECorrect-def )
lemma not-knows-k-not-ine:
assumes ¬ knows A [kE m]
shows ¬ ine A (kE m)
using assms by (metis knows2know-neg-k not-know-k-not-ine)
lemma not-knows-s-not-ine:
assumes ¬ knows A [sE m]
shows ¬ ine A (sE m)
using assms by (metis knows2know-neg-s not-know-s-not-ine)
lemma not-knows-k-not-eout :
assumes m /∈ specKeys A
and ¬ knows A [kE m]
and eoutKnowsECorrect A (kE m)
shows ¬ eout A (kE m)
using assms by (metis eout-knows-nonKS-k)
lemma not-knows-s-not-eout :
assumes m /∈ specSecrets A
and ¬ knows A [sE m]
and eoutKnowsECorrect A (sE m)
shows ¬ eout A (sE m)
using assms by (metis eout-knows-nonKS-s)
lemma adv-not-knows1 :
assumes out P ⊆ ins A
and ¬ knows A [kE m]
shows ¬ eout P (kE m)
using assms by (metis adv-not-know1 knows2know-neg-k)
lemma adv-not-knows2 :
assumes out P ⊆ ins A
and ¬ knows A [sE m]
shows ¬ eout P (sE m)
using assms by (metis adv-not-know2 knows2know-neg-s)
lemma knows-decomposition-1-k :
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assumes kKS a /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and kKS a /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and knows PQ [kE a]
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
shows knows P [kE a] ∨ knows Q [kE a]
using assms by (metis know-decomposition knows1k)
lemma knows-decomposition-1-s :
assumes sKS a /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and sKS a /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and knows PQ [sE a]
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
shows knows P [sE a] ∨ knows Q [sE a]
using assms by (metis know-decomposition knows1s)
lemma knows-decomposition-1 :
assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q}
and knows PQ [a]
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and (∃ z . a = kE z ) ∨ (∃ z . a = sE z )
and ∀ z . a = kE z −→
kKS z /∈ specKeysSecrets P ∧ kKS z /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and h7 :∀ z . a = sE z −→
sKS z /∈ specKeysSecrets P ∧ sKS z /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
shows knows P [a] ∨ knows Q [a]
using assms
by (metis knows-decomposition-1-k knows-decomposition-1-s)
lemma knows-composition1-k :
assumes (kKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and (kKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and knows P [kE m]
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
shows knows PQ [kE m]
using assms by (metis know-composition knows1k)
lemma knows-composition1-s :
assumes (sKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and (sKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and knows P [sE m]
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
37
and correctCompositionKS PQ
shows knows PQ [sE m]
using assms by (metis know-composition knows1s)
lemma knows-composition2-k :
assumes (kKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and (kKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and knows Q [kE m]
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
shows knows PQ [kE m]
using assms
by (metis know2knowsPQ-k know-composition knows2know-k)
lemma knows-composition2-s :
assumes (sKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and (sKS m) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and knows Q [sE m]
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
shows knows PQ [sE m]
using assms
by (metis know2knowsPQ-s know-composition knows2know-s)
lemma knows-composition-neg1-k :
assumes kKS m /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and kKS m /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and ¬ knows P [kE m]
and ¬ knows Q [kE m]
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
shows ¬ knows PQ [kE m]
using assms by (metis know-decomposition knows1k)
lemma knows-composition-neg1-s :
assumes sKS m /∈ specKeysSecrets P
and sKS m /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
and ¬ knows P [sE m]
and ¬ knows Q [sE m]
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionLoc PQ
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
shows ¬ knows PQ [sE m]
using assms by (metis knows-decomposition-1-s)
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lemma knows-concat-1 :
assumes knows P (a # e)
shows knows P [a]
using assms by (metis append-Cons append-Nil knows2 )
lemma knows-concat-2 :
assumes knows P (a # e)
shows knows P e
using assms by (metis append-Cons append-Nil knows2a)
lemma knows-concat-3 :
assumes knows P [a]
and knows P e
shows knows P (a # e)
using assms by (metis append-Cons append-Nil knows3 )
lemma not-knows-conc-knows-elem-not-knows-tail :
assumes ¬ knows P (a # e)
and knows P [a]
shows ¬ knows P e
using assms by (metis knows-concat-3 )
lemma not-knows-conc-not-knows-elem-tail :
assumes ¬ knows P (a#e)
shows ¬ knows P [a] ∨ ¬ knows P e
using assms by (metis append-Cons append-Nil knows3 )
lemma not-knows-elem-not-knows-conc:
assumes ¬ knows P [a]
shows ¬ knows P (a # e)
using assms by (metis knows-concat-1 )
lemma not-knows-tail-not-knows-conc:
assumes ¬ knows P e
shows ¬ knows P (a # e)
using assms by (metis knows-concat-2 )
lemma knows-composition3 :
fixes e::Expression list
assumes knows P e
and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ
and cCompKS :correctCompositionKS PQ
and ∀ (m::Expression). ((m mem e) −→
((∃ z1 . m = (kE z1 )) ∨ (∃ z2 . m = (sE z2 ))))
and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P e
and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr Q e
shows knows PQ e
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using assms
proof (induct e)
case Nil
from this show ?case by (simp only: knows-emptyexpression)
next
fix a l
case (Cons a l)
from Cons have sg1 :knows P [a] by (simp add : knows-concat-1 )
from Cons have sg2 :knows P l by (simp only: knows-concat-2 )
from sg1 have sg3 :a mem (a # l) by simp
from Cons and sg2 have sg2a:knows PQ l
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-L2 )
from Cons and sg1 and sg2 and sg3 show ?case
proof (cases ∃ z1 . a = kE z1 )
assume ∃ z1 . a = (kE z1 )
from this obtain z where a1 :a = (kE z ) by auto
from a1 and Cons have sg4 :(kKS z ) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
from a1 and Cons have sg5 :(kKS z ) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
from sg1 and a1 have sg6 :knows P [kE z ] by simp
from sg4 and sg5 and sg6 and subPQ and cCompI and cCompKS
have knows PQ [kE z ]
by (rule knows-composition1-k)
from this and sg2a and a1 show ?case by (simp add : knows-concat-3 )
next
assume ¬ (∃ z1 . a = kE z1 )
from this and Cons and sg3 have ∃ z2 . a = (sE z2 ) by auto
from this obtain z where a2 :a = (sE z ) by auto
from a2 and Cons have sg8 :(sKS z ) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
from a2 and Cons have sg9 :(sKS z ) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
from sg1 and a2 have sg10 :knows P [sE z ] by simp
from sg8 and sg9 and sg10 and subPQ and cCompI and cCompKS
have knows PQ [sE z ]
by (rule knows-composition1-s)
from this and sg2a and a2 show ?case by (simp add : knows-concat-3 )
qed
qed
lemma knows-composition4 :
assumes knows Q e
and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ
and cCompKS :correctCompositionKS PQ
and ∀ m. m mem e −→ ((∃ z . m = kE z ) ∨ (∃ z . m = sE z ))
and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P e
and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr Q e
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shows knows PQ e
using assms
proof (induct e)
case Nil
from this show ?case by (simp only: knows-emptyexpression)
next
fix a l
case (Cons a l)
from Cons have sg1 :knows Q [a] by (simp add : knows-concat-1 )
from Cons have sg2 :knows Q l by (simp only: knows-concat-2 )
from sg1 have sg3 :a mem (a # l) by simp
from Cons and sg2 have sg2a:knows PQ l
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-L2 )
from Cons and sg1 and sg2 and sg3 show ?case
proof (cases ∃ z1 . a = kE z1 )
assume ∃ z1 . a = (kE z1 )
from this obtain z where a1 :a = (kE z ) by auto
from a1 and Cons have sg4 :(kKS z ) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
from a1 and Cons have sg5 :(kKS z ) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
from sg1 and a1 have sg6 :knows Q [kE z ] by simp
from sg4 and sg5 and sg6 and subPQ and cCompI and cCompKS
have knows PQ [kE z ]
by (rule knows-composition2-k)
from this and sg2a and a1 show ?case by (simp add : knows-concat-3 )
next
assume ¬ (∃ z1 . a = kE z1 )
from this and Cons and sg3 have ∃ z2 . a = (sE z2 ) by auto
from this obtain z where a2 :a = (sE z ) by auto
from a2 and Cons have sg8 :(sKS z ) /∈ specKeysSecrets P
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
from a2 and Cons have sg9 :(sKS z ) /∈ specKeysSecrets Q
by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
from sg1 and a2 have sg10 :knows Q [sE z ] by simp
from sg8 and sg9 and sg10 and subPQ and cCompI and cCompKS
have knows PQ [sE z ]
by (rule knows-composition2-s)
from this and sg2a and a2 show ?case by (simp add : knows-concat-3 )
qed
qed
lemma knows-composition5 :
assumes knows P e ∨ knows Q e
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q}
and correctCompositionIn PQ
and correctCompositionKS PQ
and ∀ m. m mem e −→ ((∃ z . m = kE z ) ∨ (∃ z . m = sE z ))
and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P e
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and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr Q e
shows knows PQ e
using assms by (metis knows-composition3 knows-composition4 )
end
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